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In this paper we examine a financial accelerator hypothesis analyzing the determinants of 
firm-level interest rates. Using a panel of the financial statements of 448 Czech firms in 1996-
2002, we find that firm’s balance sheet indicators are important determinant for the firm-level 
interest rates. Indebtness and market access matter in particular. The strength of balance 
sheets is procyclical. There is also evidence that monetary policy has stronger effects 
on small firms and during a period of the excess demand for credit (but not during a 
downturn).  
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An accurate understanding of monetary policy transmission is a key for efficient 
implementation of monetary policy. While there is large empirical evidence on monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in the Euro area (see Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon, 2003), 
we still do not have sufficient knowledge about the transmission mechanism in the new EU 
member states (NMSs). This is striking for various reasons, e.g. as many of the NMSs are 
likely to join the Euro area in near future. This paper aims to bridge this gap by providing 
empirical evidence on the balance sheet channel in the Czech Republic. 
 
Given an assumption of imperfect capital markets (information asymmetries and/or contract 
enforcement problems); there is a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. 
Balance sheet channel links the cost of external finance to the financial position of the 
borrower.
1 As a result, under contractionary shock, firm’s internal sources of funding 
typically worsen and firms become more dependent on external finance. However, at the same 
time the costs of external finance have a tendency to increase, as the financial health of 
borrower weakens. The greater dependence on external funding at time when the cost of 
external funding increase literature labels as financial accelerator effect (Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1999). In consequence, the strength of balance sheet amplifies output 
fluctuations (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  
 
According to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), monetary policy might have asymmetric effects 
over the cycle, i.e. to be more potent in downturns than in booms.
2 In addition, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996) suggest that monetary policy shocks have 
stronger effects on small firms than on larger firms as a result of unequal access to external 
financing. Boissay (2001) puts forward that financial accelerator effects might be particularly 
strong, when firms are credit rationed. 
 
In this paper, we examine the aforementioned suppositions using a large dataset of the 
financial statements of Czech firms in 1996-2002. First, we study if balance sheet position 
affects the interest rate the firms are charged. Second, we analyze to what extent balance sheet 
position is procyclical. Third, we investigate if monetary policy has heterogeneous effects, i.e. 
affecting more strongly small firms and during the downturn. Forth, the specificity of Czech 
credit market in the 1990s offers a unique opportunity to study if the monetary policy shocks 
influence firms more when they are credit rationed.   
 
As such, this paper contributes to existing evidence on the firm-level investment dynamics in 
the Czech Republic (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002a; Lizal and Svejnar, 2002b; Konings, Rizov and 
Vandenbusche, 2003 or Hanousek and Filler, 2004). In general, these authors study the role of 
                                                           
1 Calstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) 
are examples of modeling the interactions between the cost of finance and financial health of 
borrower.  
2 See also Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994). Another stream of literature – in order to obtain 
asymmetric effects of monetary policy – highlights the role of downward price rigidity; see Ball and 
Mankiw (1994). Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence from Euro area countries tends to challenge 
the assumption of downward price rigidity (Dhyne et al., 2005). To our knowledge, empirical evidence 
on downward price rigidity does not exist for the Czech economy. Empirical evidence from 
neighboring country –Slovakia – also suggests only weak evidence for downward price rigidity, as 
price decreases are quite common; see Coricelli and Horvath (2005).   
  3ownership, credit rationing and soft-budget constraints. While all aforementioned studies 
provide important insights into the nature of Czech firm’s investment dynamics, they typically 
employ the data from mid-1990s. More recently, Pruteanu (2004a) analyses whether banks 
credit rationed Czech enterprises during 1997-2002. To address the problems in identification 
of credit rationing
3, Pruteanu applies disequilibrium model of aggregate supply and demand 
for newly granted loans and draws the conclusion that credit rationing (e.g. excess demand for 
loans) occurred during the period 1999:1-2000:12. Consequently, we make use of this finding 
and test, if monetary policy has stronger effects during this particular period.   
 
Typically, the econometric studies investigating the financial accelerator effects analyze the 
firm-level investment dynamics (see Vermeulen, 2002 or Berg, Hansen and Sellin, 2004). 
Only few studies focus on the determinants of firm-level interest rates within financial 
accelerator framework. Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen (2002) inter alia analyze firm-level 
interest rate dynamics in four largest Euro area countries in an error-correction framework. 
They find that firm’s characteristics matter for the interest rates the firms are charged. In 
contrast to our results, they find little evidence that monetary policy in these countries has a 
heterogeneous impact on the firms and over the business cycle. Benito and Whitley (2003) 
study the factors affecting the firm-level interest rates in the UK in a dynamic panel setting 
and their results indicate that balance sheet position is important determinant of interest rates, 
too. In our paper, however, we apply slightly different estimation strategy than these two 
aforementioned studies.  
 
In addition, we enrich the scarce literature on the monetary policy transmission in the Czech 
Republic. To our knowledge, this issue is studied systematically at the micro-level only by 
Pruteanu (2004b) and Schmitz (2004).
4 Pruteanu focuses on the bank-lending channel. She 
finds that monetary policy affects the growth rate of loans more strongly in 1999-2001 in 
comparison to 1996-1998. In addition, there is certain evidence that monetary policy had 
heterogeneous effects on bank lending in 1999-2001. Similarly, Schmitz studies the role of 
banks in monetary policy transmission in several EU new member states over the period 
1990-2001. While Schmitz finds that bank lending reacts significantly to monetary policy 
tightening, she finds no evidence for heterogeneity in the monetary policy effects.
5  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the description of our dataset as well as 
estimation methodology. In section 3, we present the descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis. We conclude in section 4. Finally, Appendix with some additional results and a 
detailed description of the construction of variables follow.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
                                                           
3 Note that the drop in the amount of credit does not necessarily imply credit rationing, as the demand 
for loans might have fallen as well (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
4 At the macro level, Arnostova and Hurnik (2005) study monetary transmission mechanism in the 
Czech economy using VARs.   
5 In our opinion, the choice of sample period is highly problematic, as Schmitz’s sample starts already 
in 1990. For example, interest rate ceilings were in use and the banks were solely owned by the state at 
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The data employed in this paper for the aggregate level analysis are derived from public 
database ARAD operated by the Czech National Bank. The data for the aggregate analysis 
include debt outstanding and interest rates. Both variables are coded according to their 
maturity as the short, medium and long-term (see Appendix A.3 for the details). Primarily, we 
use these data to estimate representative aggregate interest rate for a comparison with the 
firm-level sample interest rates.    
 
The data for the firm-level analysis in the paper are obtained from company records by the 
private company ‘ČEKIA Agency’ as a part of their MAGNUS dataset. The unbalanced panel 
dataset covers the end of year financial statements of 461 non-financial companies from 1993 
to 2002. For each firm, we have balance sheet and profit and loss accounts available. The 
dataset also contains a detailed description of economic activity for each firm. Using this 
information, we divide firms into 16 industries, as classified by the Czech Statistical Office: 
agriculture, food production, beverage and tobacco production, mining and processing of 
minerals and ors, textile & leather production, wood processing and paper production, 
chemical & pharmaceutics and rubber production, construction, metallurgy, machine building, 
electronics, power engineering, transportation, commerce, glass & pottery and the others.  
 
As a prelude to estimation, we exclude the firm records, which suffer from apparent 
inconsistencies. First consistency check is simply to examine if the data takes on the expected 
values. For example, the value of assets should be positive. Analogously, the ratio of various 
items from financial statements should exhibit the expected values. For instance, the ratio of 
liquid assets to assets or debt to assets should lie between zero and one. On this basis, we 
exclude 6 firms from the sample.  
 
Next, there are only three firm records in the dataset available for the year 1993, two for 1994 
and six records for the year 1995. In consequence, we use the company records from only in 
the period between 1996 and 2002. Besides, majority of observations comes from the period 
1999-2002. While for the year 1996, 1997 and 1998 dataset contains 17, 39 and 81 firms 
respectively, the number of firms in the years 1999-2002 is more than 300. Namely, there are 
309, 390, 362 and 305 firms for the years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively. In total, 
the unbalanced sample counts for 1494 observations of 448 firms. Typically, we are able to 
track at least three subsequent years of the records for a given firm.  
 
Estimation Methodology 
In our paper, we first link the interest rate charged to a balance sheet position. Balance sheet 
position is approximated by the extent of leverage, liquidity, market access and the value of 
collateral. We also analyze, if small firms pay higher interest rates on average and also if the 
firm-level interest rates increase during downturn. Next, we examine if monetary policy 
shocks have hetererogeneous effects on firms according to their size. Finally, we investigate 
whether monetary policy affects firm-level interest rates more strongly during downturn and 
during (what may be labeled as) credit rationing period. 
 
First, we estimate the equation linking balance sheet indicators to firm-level interest rates: 
 
it i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i it e u ACCESS A CF A DEBT A COLL IR + + + + + + = , 5 , , 4 , , 3 , , 2 1 / / / α α α α α                 (1)  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the outset of transition in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with 
caution.   6
 
Dependent variable,  it IR , represents the firm-level interest rate paid by the i-th firm at time t 
computed from the firm’s financial statements (as the ratio of interest rate expenses to long-
term debt excluding interest-free credits).6  it COLL  stands for the firm’s collateral, which is 
represented by the firm’s tangible and intangible assets,  it DEBT  is the company net debt. 
it CF  is the cash flow generated.7  it COLL ,  it DEBT  and it CF  are normalized by it A , which is i-
th firm assets at time t. The extent of short-term financing is captured by it ACCESS , which 
stands as the proxy for assessing the degree of market access of i-th firm at time t. This is 
calculated as one minus the ratio of short term debt to total debt. ui is an unobserved firm or 
industry fixed effect and eit is a error term. A detailed derivation of all the variables is 
presented in the Appendix A.2. 
 
The sign of  2 α  is expected to be negative. The firm with greater collateral value is likely to 
be charged smaller interest rate, as collateral secures the debt (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). 
Estimated  3 α  should yield positive sign. More leveraged firms are more likely to default and 
thus lender wants to be compensated by greater interest rate. The sign of  4 α  should be 
negative. More liquid firms are likely to be charged smaller interest rate and thus cash flow 
should be negatively associated with firm-level interest rates.  5 α  is likely to be negative. 
Firms with better access to external funds are likely to encounter smaller interest rates. The 
underlying supposition is that more risky firms are unable to receive long-term finance and 
thus are forced to finance their projects with short-term debt (Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin, 
2005). 
 
Additionally, we investigate, if the interest rates charged are typically larger for small firms 
and/or during economic downturn. For convenience, balance sheet indicators ( it it A COLL /,  
it it A DEBT /,   it it A CF /  and  it ACCESS ) are labeled as it X  thereafter.  
 
it i t t t i it e u S RECESSION X IR + + + + + = 4 3 , 2 1 β β β β                                                 (2) 
In addition to the equation (1), we include two dummy variables into the equation (2). 
t RECESSION  dummy captures, if the country records negative growth rates in time t.  i S  is a 
dummy to assess, if small firms typically encounter greater interest rates.   
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6
PT Benito and Whitley (2003) discuss the drawbacks this measure of firm-level interest rate may 
eventually have. If the firm reduces the amount of their debt substantially during in the course of the 
year, the resulting measure of firm-level interest rates based on end of year balance sheets may be 
‘artificially’ high. To address the empirical relevance of this issue, we provide a correlation of our 
measure of interest rates and aggregate interest rates and also re-estimate all the equations with firms 
exhibiting interest rates above 25% (5% of sample). In addition, we estimate the equations without 
outliers, excluding 5% of smallest and highest interest rates. The empirical results suggest that this 
issue is of rather limited relevance in our sample. The obvious advantage of using this measure of 
interest rates is that it provides large cross-sectional information, which is otherwise hardly available.     
TP
7
PT An alternative indicator of liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to assets. In our sample, the 
correlation of liquid assets and cash flow (both normalized by assets) is 0.76. In consequence, we do 
not report the results with liquid assets, as the results are qualitatively very similar.    7
3 β  is expected to be positive for various reasons. For example, banks may contract their 
lending during downturn. Similarly,  4 β  is likely to be negative, too. This is because small 
firms are more risky and/or entail greater agency costs for borrower (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1990).  
 
Next, we examine, whether there is a heterogeneity in monetary policy effects. We test this 
supposition in three steps. First, we estimate if the response to monetary policy shocks varies 
with the size of firm. Second, we assess, if the monetary policy is more powerful during the 
downturn, as compared to upturn. Third, we analyze, if monetary policy has greater effects 
during credit rationing period. The following three equations captures these issues more 
formally. 
 
it i i t i t i t t i i it e u L i M i S i X IR + + + + + + = * * * 5 4 3 , 1 χ χ χ χ χ                                       (3a) 
it i t t t t t i i it e u BOOM i RECESSION i X IR + + + + + = * * 4 3 , 1 δ δ δ δ                                 (3b) 
it i t t t t t i it e u NOCRUNCH i CRUNCH i X IR + + + + + = * * 4 3 , 2 1 φ φ φ φ                            (3c) 
 
Equation (3a) links the firm-level interest rates to a vector  it X  of balance sheet indicators and 
three additional explanatory variables. These are  i t S i * ,  i t M i *  and  i t L i * .  t i  is an yearly 
average of 2-week repurchase rate (policy rate of the Czech National Bank),  i S ,  i M  and  i L  
are dummy variables for small, medium and large firms (according to the assets of firms), 
respectively. It is expected that  5 4 3 χ χ χ f f ; e.g. that monetary policy shocks have the 
strongest effects on small firms, as compared to medium and large firms (Mojon, Smets and 
Vermeulen, 2002).8 
 
Analogously, equation (3b) captures the effect of business cycle on the firm-level interest 
rates controlling for balance sheet indicators.  t RECESSION  is a dummy variable taking on 
unit value, if the economic growth has been negative in a given year. Conversely,  t BOOM  
denotes the dummy variable stating when economic growth has been positive. In our sample, 
Czech Republic recorded negative year-on-year real GDP growth in 1997 and 1998 (-0.8% 
and -1%, respectively). It is further expected that  4 3 δ δ f ; e.g. monetary policy is more potent 
during downturn.  
 
Similarly to the equations (3a) and (3b), equation (3c) is constructed to assess the 
heterogeneous effects of monetary policy, when firms are largely credit rationed. Credit 
rationing, as captured by dummy variable  t CRUNCH , is defined as when there has been 
excess demand for the bank loans (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). According to empirical 
study by Pruteanu (2004a), credit rationing of Czech enterprises has occurred mainly in 
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PT It is noteworthy that piece-wise correlations of these three variables lie between -0.13 and -0.15 and 
thus, the level of multicollinearity is likely to be very low. Analogously, multicollinearity is not likely 
to be an issue when estimating the equations (3b) and (3c) as well.   8
1999:1-2000:12. Therefore,  t CRUNCH  takes a value of one in 1999 and 2000, zero 
otherwise. Boissay (2001) derives a model, which shows that financial accelerator is 
particularly strong, when firms are credit rationed. It is thus expected that monetary policy 
effects are likely to be stronger during this period and  4 3 φ φ f . As aforementioned, a detailed 
derivation of all the variables is presented in the Appendix A.2. 
 
Regarding our econometric strategy, we do not apply dynamic panel data estimators (which is 
typical for this stream of literature) in this paper for two following reasons. First, if applied, 
the number of observations reduces to about 1/3, as time dimension of our sample is rather 
short. Second, the lagged dependent variable has been actually insignificant in all the 
specifications we estimated (not presented in the text). Additional issue is the eventual severe 
bias in the estimates, when dynamic panel data estimators are applied to small samples. 
Nerlove (2002) emphasizes that Arellano-Bond method is inappropriate, when the time 
dimension of panel is short. In consequence, the estimation of the presented equations is 
based on the instrumental variables static panel data models. The list of instruments is as 
follows: exogenous explanatory variables, selected industry and time dummies. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
In this section, we investigate empirically the financial accelerator effects in the balance 
sheets of Czech firms. First, we analyze the role of balance sheet position in explaining the 
firm-level interest rates. Second, we study if the monetary policy of the Czech National Bank 
exhibited heterogeneous effects in the sample period, i.e. have stronger effects on small firm, 
during downturn and during credit rationing period. 
 
The adequacy of our measure of sample firm-level interest rate is examined in Chart 1. We 
compare this interest rate with the aggregate interest rate. Aggregate interest rates are 
calculated as the weighted average of inter-bank interest rates according to their maturity (see 
Appendix A.3 for the details on the construction). The weights are determined by the amount 
of outstanding loans. The sample interest rates are well correlated with the aggregate interest 
rates and thus our sample is likely to be representative. 







































Next, we present the distribution of firm-level interest rates in Chart 2. The chart provides 
evidence of a large firm heterogeneity in terms of interest rates they pay to the banks. Besides, 
it seems that the cross-sectional variation in the interest rates depends on the mean firm-level 
interest rate. When the average rates are higher, the variation increases. This means that the 
firm heterogeneity tends to increase during the bad times. Eventually, it tells that credit 
conditions worsen more than proportionally for certain firms during the downturns. For 
instance, the firm-level interest rate at 25
th percentile stands at around 7% and increases to 8% 
during the downturn, while the corresponding increase at 75
th percentile is from 12% to 18%. 
Benito and Whitley (2003) using UK data find similar pattern in firm-level interest rate 
dynamics as well.  
 












































Note: The chart presents 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of the firm-level interest rate over time. 
 
  9Table 1 –Firm-level Interest Rates 
  Mean  Std. Err.  No. of Obs. 
Small firms  12.04 0.48 493 
Medium firms  9.67 0.32 493 
Large firms  8.86 0.36 508 
Downturn 12.88 0.71 120 
Boom 10.02 0.24 1376 
Credit rationing  10.94 0.35 699 
No credit rationing  9.65 0.29 797 
Note: See the main text for explanation of the terms in table. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on firm-level interest rates. Generally, the interest 
rate, the firms pay, decrease with the size of firm. Rates are also higher in downturn, as 
compared to boom. Similarly, the result show that interest rates increased during the period 
when firms tend to be credit rationed. Empirical investigation in this section aims to uncover 
the reasons behind this variation in interest rates, focusing specifically on the monetary policy 
effects.  
 
Chart 3 shows that when internal sources of financing deteriorate, the credit conditions are 
likely to be tight. This either suggests the presence of financial accelerator effect or simply the 
increase of firm’s default risk, when internal sources weaken. The ability to finance 
investment from internal sources is proxied by ratio the firm’s equity to its assets. The credit 
conditions are assessed simply by the sample mean of firm-level interest rate.  
 










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Equity/Assets Firm-level interest rate
 
 
Balance sheet indicators are procyclical, to a large extent. Chart 4 plots the GDP growth and 
balance sheet indicators (all normalized to one in 1996 and in real terms).
9 There is a 
remarkable deterioration in the strength of balance sheet indicators during the downturn in 
1997-1998. For example, firm’s collateral value as well as cash flow dropped by some 40-
                                                           
9 Alternatively, the results are analogous using output gap instead. 
  1050% from 1996 to 1998.
10 Market access worsens since 1996 and recovers only gradually. 
Additionally, Appendix A.1 in Table 7-8 presents some descriptive statistics of the balance 
sheet indicators.    
 
Chart 4 – GDP growth and Balance Sheet Indicators, 1996-2002 
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Next, we study how the firm’s balance sheet position affects the level of interest rates the firm 
is charged. We present the determinants of individual (firm-level) interest rates in Table 2 
(estimation of the equation (1) is carried out by IV panel data fixed effects estimator).
11 We 
report the results for five various specifications together to give some insights of the 
sensitivity of the estimates. The results suggest that, among the balance sheet indicators, 
leverage and market access matter in particular. There is also certain evidence that firms 
generating large cash flow pay typically smaller interest rates (see also Table 9 in Appendix 
A.1). In addition, we report the results for the effect of economic downturn on the firm-level 
of interest rates. The results indicate that Czech firms have been charged greater interest rates 
during the slowdown of the economy.  
 
                                                           
10 This number seems to be very high at first glance, but note that in case the value of capital did not 
change from 1997 to 1998, the corresponding fall in our collateral measure would be around 20% (that 
time inflation rate slightly above 10% and the assumed 8% annual depreciation of capital).   
11 In several specifications, random effects estimator has been consistent, as indicated by Hausman 
test. We do not report these results for the sake of space. We also re-estimated all the specifications 
with the bootstrapped standard errors. In majority of specification, bootstrapped errors has been close 
to asymptotic standard errors. The results with bootstrapped standard errors are not presented either.  
  11Table 2 – Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Net Debt  8.80**  6.31  8.33**  6.19  3.42* 
  (3.50)  (4.12)  (3.58) (4.14) (1.95) 
Market Access  -39.8*  -46.65  -48.84**  -49.14*   
 (24.7)  (26.23)  (25.71)  (26.96)   
Cash  flow    -38.04   -33.50  
   (27.32)    (27.68)   
Downturn     2.10*  1.91  1.62*** 
      (1.22) (1.29) (0.94) 
         
Fixed Effects  1.20**  1.06  1.14*  1.03  1.89*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.003 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.07 
Observations  1494  1494  1494 1494 1494 
Note: ***, ** and * - denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Asymptotic standard errors in 
brackets. Net debt and cash flow are divided by assets (see section 2.2).  
 
Remarkably, collateral has been insignificant in all the specifications probably reflecting the 
difficulty with law enforcement during the sample period (see Roland and Verdier, 2003). The 
results with collateral as an explanatory variable are thus presented only in the Appendix A.1 
Table 9. Similarly, we test for potential non-linearities by including the squared values of the 
explanatory variables, but they are not significant as well (not presented).  
 
Table 3 gives the results for the determinants of firm-level interest rates investigating the 
impact of downturn and small firms in particular. Small firms typically pay higher interest 
rates, as it is more difficult for lenders to monitor them. However, significant small firm and 
downturn variables do not necessarily imply the financial accelerator effects. It may simply 
reflect greater risk of firms during the downturn or greater risk inherent in small firms, 
respectively. For this reason, we investigate if monetary policy shocks propagate more 
strongly to the small firms (or during downturn), controlling for balance sheet indicators as 
the proxy of firm’s risk. 
 
Table 3 - Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Net Debt  8.38*  6.25    3.73**  1.82* 
 (4.53)  (4.74)    (1.82)  (1.69) 
Market Access  -53.03  -50.65  -2.08     
 (35.87)  (34.16)  (7.75)     
Cash  flow    -34.6     
    (32.08)     
Small firms  46.86  34.48  18.57**  19.19**  14.04* 
  (59.17)  (57.40) (7.79) (9.12) (8.45) 
Downturn           1.57* 
         (0.92) 
         
Fixed Effects  0.74  0.79  2.29**  1.70***  2.09*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.02 0.03  0.03  0.01  0.002 
Observations  1494  1494  1494 1494 1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2.  
 
Table 4 - Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates, Size of Firm and Monetary 
  12Policy 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Net Debt  1.00    -1.38     
 (2.01)    (1.54)     
Market Access  -18.23**  -15.87**       
 (8.73)  (6.66)       
Repo*Small Firm  1.07***  0.98***  0.92***  0.94***  0.95*** 
 (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
Repo*Medium Firm  -0.17  0.15  0.15  0.02**  0.06 
 (0.38)  (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.29)  (0.34) 
Repo*Large Firm          -0.06 
         (0.31) 
          
Fixed Effects  2.31**  2.68***  2.78***  2.49***  2.48*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.06 0.09  0.07  0.03  0.03 
Observations 1494  1494  1494  1494  1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2.  
 
Table 4 documents a heterogeneous impact of monetary policy on firms. Controlling for the 
strength of balance sheet indicators, we find that small firms react more strongly to monetary 
policy shocks, in comparison to medium and large firms. The coefficient on the product of 
repo rate and small firm dummy is always by far largest and significant. Interestingly, we find 
weak evidence that monetary policy affects the interest rates that the large firms are charged. 
This may indicate that large firms have close ties with the banks and therefore, monetary 
policy shocks are likely to have smaller impact on them. Overall, our results correspond to 
Vermeulen (2002), who finds that financial accelerator effects have been strongest for small 
firm’s investment dynamics in a sample of four largest Euro area countries. To the contrary, 
the result of Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen (2002) do not point to that monetary policy effects 
would be stronger of small firm’s interest rates.  
 
Table 5 - Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates, Downturn and Monetary 
Policy Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Net  Debt  -5.94***       
  (2.23)       
Market Access  -17.30***  -26.98***    -14.20**  -9.06 
 (7.58)  (7.56)    (6.53)  (6.43) 
Repo*Downturn 0.67***  0.48***  0.29***  0.18***   
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.05)   
Repo*Boom 1.09***  0.70***  0.35**    -0.03 
  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.10) 
         
Fixed  Effects  2.96***  2.55***  2.64*** 2.80*** 2.79*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.13  0.07  0.02 0.07 0.07 
Observations  1494  1494  1494 1494 1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2.  
 
Table 5 displays the results on the asymmetric effect of monetary policy over the business 
cycle. There are several studies investigating the potential asymmetry of monetary policy. 
Using Austrian data over the period 1976-1998, Kaufmann (2002) finds that monetary policy 
effects are indeed asymmetric over the business cycle. Similarly, Peersman and Smets (2005) 
find the asymmetric impact of monetary policy on industrial production in the Euro area 
countries.  
  13 
Contrary to expectations laid in the previous section, our results do not suggest that monetary 
policy is more potent during the downturn. Rather it seems that monetary policy effects are 
actually stronger during boom period, despite coefficients on   and 
 are not always statistically different. In our opinion, the lack of asymmetric 
effects of monetary policy may reflect rather short time sample or specificity of Czech credit 
market during the 1990s. Credit market has been characterized by rather soft budget 
constraints at the outset of transition and subsequent credit rationing at the end of the 1990s 
(Hampl and Matousek, 2000).  
t t RECESSION i *
t t BOOM i *
Table 6 - Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates, Credit Rationing and 
Monetary Policy Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Net  Debt  -5.20***       
  (1.90)       
Market Access  -12.61*  -22.84***    -9.35  -10.38 
 (7.47)  (7.07)    (6.37)  (6.60) 
Repo*Credit Rationing  0.75**  0.56***  0.42***  0.17***   
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.06)   
Repo*No Credit Rationing   0.51***  0.39***  0.27***    0.03 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
         
Fixed Effects  3.19***  2.66***  2.64***  2.79***  2.8*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.13  0.08  0.02 0.07 0.07 
Observations  1494  1494  1494 1494 1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2.  
 
Table 6 presents the results for heterogeneous impact of monetary policy depending on credit 
conditions. If the credit conditions are tight, it is likely the small policy rate changes trigger 
greater reaction in the firm-level interest rates, than otherwise. We identify tight credit 
conditions using the results of Pruteanu (2004a). Pruteanu finds that period 1999:1-2000:12 
might be labeled as credit rationing period, as her empirical results suggest that moderate 
excess demand for bank loans has existed in this period. She argues that excess demand has 
been a consequence of downturn in 1997-1998 and continuing instability in the banking 
sector. After an economic recovery the demand for loans has enhanced, however this was not 
followed by the sufficient growth in the loan supply given the lack of improvement in the 
issues related to very high level of bad loans in the Czech banking sector. Indeed, our results 
suggest that monetary policy has significantly stronger effects on firm-level interest rate in 
1999-2000, e.g. during credit rationing period. Our results are therefore in line with Boissay 
(2001). Boissay presents a model in which financial accelerator effects are particularly strong 
in the presence of credit rationing.  
 
  144. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the determinants of firm-level interest rates using a panel of the 
financial statements of Czech firms over the period 1996-2002. Namely, we assess the role of 
firm’s financial position on the cost of external finance. In addition, we examine, if monetary 
policy has heterogeneous effects on firms according to their size and if the response to 
monetary policy effects are time-varying. Examining the heterogeneity of monetary policy 
shocks allows us assessing existence of financial accelerator effects in the Czech economy.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that balance sheet indicators are important determinant of balance 
sheet indicators. We find that, among balance sheet indicators, leverage and market access 
(maturity structure of debt) matter in particular. Besides, the strength of balance sheet 
indicators is procyclical, to a large extent. We also find evidence on the heterogeneous impact 
of monetary policy shocks. Monetary policy has stronger effects on small firms in comparison 
to medium and large firms. Yet, we find no evidence that monetary policy effects depends on 
business cycle. On the other hand, monetary policy is more potent during period when the 
banks credit rationed the firms.  
 
To sum up, the results in this paper indicate that balance sheet indicators are important 
determinant of interest rates the firms are charged by the borrowers and monetary policy 
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UAppendix 
A.1 Additional Results 
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics 
  Assets  Cash Flow  Int. rate  Market 
Access 
Net Debt 
  Mean  3896273  326471 10.20 27.04  868762.4 
 Median  836426  47029  8.46  18.71  151275.5 
 Maximum  202000000  22734922  83.79  100  55383697 
  Minimum 40561  -9750211 0 0  -539928 
 Std. Dev.  14113927  1651051  8.57  27.18  3339631 
  Skewness  10.24  7.74 3.29 0.93  10.74 
  Observations  1494  1494 1494 1494 1494 
No.  of  Firms  448  448 448 448 448 
 
Table 8 – Year Averages of All Variables 





1996 2946585  329320.7  1487655  9.34  36.53  475108.1 
1997 4047294  268358.4  1956749  10.47  31.23  980659.9 
1998 2376038  171819.8  1075408  14.04  25.65  678681.5 
1999 3902052  192052.1  1940313  11.69  26.74  980361.5 
2000 3873551  371072  1740596  10.36  25.77  836090.3 
2001 3849908  330184.2  1632949  9.35  26.6  872800.2 
2002 4405218  449294.4  1682072  8.73  28  848533.5 
 
Table 9 - Determinants of Firm-level Interest Rates 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net Debt  -4.06  10.07  10.05     
 (12.41)  (22.14)  (14.2)     
Market Access  -45.15** -53.95*  -27.93     
 (19.3)  (29.2)  (21.82)     
Cash flow  -3.55  -49.94  -51.07  -51.62**  -53.31** 
 (49.5)  (83.43)  (51.7)  (26.26)  (26.66) 
Collateral 14.18  -5.15  -6.35  4.66  0.76 
 (16.07)  (29.24)  (15.57)  (9.08)  (9.93) 
Downturn    2.16     
    (1.96)     
Small  firms     2.42  1.26 
     (2.61)  (1.20) 
        
Fixed Effects  1.48***  0.69  0.74  1.54***  1.48*** 
R-sqr. overall  0.06  0.002  0.01  0.001  0.001 
Observations 1494  1494  1494 1494 1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2. Net debt, cash flow and collateral divided by assets.  
 
A.2 Construction of Variables for Estimating Equations (1) – (3) 
The firm-level interest rate for i-th firm,  it IR , at time t is computed as follows:                
it it it LDEBT INREX IR = , where  it INREX  are interest expenses from the Profit-Loss   19
Account and long-term debt  ) ( it LDEBT  is a sum of non-current liabilities and bank loans and 
borrowings from Balance Sheet, all for i-th firm at time t. The total amount of debt 
outstanding from provisions and short-term liabilities is not used, as no interest is paid in this 
case.   
 
To compute the collateral value of illiquid assets -  it COLL , we first estimate the depreciation 
rate as follows:  e CAPITAL ON DEPRECIATI it it + + = β α , where  it ON DEPRECIATI  is a 
depreciation of tangible and intangible fixed assets from Profit-Loss Accounts and 
it CAPITAL  is a sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets from the Balance Sheets.  
 
Having estimated the above equation by the fixed effects estimator, the results indicate that 
annual depreciation rate is 8.3% (simple OLS reports the value of 8.4%). This rate is 
somewhat higher than findings reported by Lizal (1999). Lizal, using comparable 
methodology, estimates the annual rate of depreciation between 4.8-5%.12 The data used in 
Lizal’s paper are from the period 1992-1995 and this may explain the differences between our 
and his results. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with Czech accounting system since 
the depreciation rate may legally range between 2 and 20%. Controlling for industry effects 
influences the estimated depreciation only minimally. As a result, we work with depreciation 
rate of 8%, when deriving the value of collateral.    
 
In this regard, the estimated rate of depreciation is used to compute collateral value of illiquid 
assets as:  1 , , , ) 1 ( − − + = t i t i t i K I COLL δ , where  t i COLL ,  is the collateral value of illiquid assets 
in i-th firm at time t,  t i I ,  is i-th firms’ investment at time t,  1 , − t i K  is a booked value of illiquid 
assets at time t-1 and δ  is rate of depreciation as computed above. As  1 − − = t t t K K I ,                                      
the value of collateral is computed finally as follows:  1 , , , − − = t i t i t i K K COLL δ .                                                   
 
Market access  it ACCESS  is measured as one minus the ratio of short-term debt to the total 
company debt. Short-term debt is the current liabilities from Balance Sheets. Total company 
debt is calculated as the sum of current liabilities, non-current liabilities and bank loans and 
borrowings from Balance Sheets. This proxy estimates the extent of short-term financing.  
 
Cash flow  it CF  generated by the firm is calculated as the sum of the depreciation of the 
tangible and the intangible assets and the net income from Profit-Loss Accounts.  
 
t RECESSION  dummy takes on a value of 1, when the GDP y-o-y growth is negative (In our 
sample, these are the years 1997-1998). Analogously,  t BOOM  dummy has zero value, when 
y-o-y growth is positive. 
 
i t S i * ,  i t M i *  and  i t L i *  are a product of the year average of 2-week repurchase rate of the 
Czech National Bank and small, medium and large firm dummy, respectively.  i S  dummy 
takes on a value of 1, when the firm’s assets are smaller than 33rd percentile of the sample. 
                                                           
TP
12
PT Some of his alternative specifications lead to the estimate of annual depreciation about 6.3%.   20
i M  dummy takes a value of one, when firm’s assets are between 33rd and 66th percentile.  i L  
dummy is one, when firm’s assets are between 33rd and 66th percentile. 
 
t CRUNCH  is a dummy having the value of one in 1999-2000, when firms were credit 
rationed (see the main text), zero otherwise. On the other hand,  t NOCRUNCH  value is one in 
1996-1998 and 2001-2002, zero otherwise. 
 
A.3 Construction of Weighted Aggregate Interest Rates 
We use the weighted aggregate interest rate to compare with the sample firm-level interest 
rates (see Chart 1).  
 
We compute this interest rate as a weighted average of interest rate at the monthly 
frequency. The volume of debt outstanding weights maturity structure of interest rate 


























=              
 
Where AIRBt 
Bis aggregate interest rate at time t, stBt
B is the amount of short-term debt outstanding 
at time t, mtBt
B is the amount of mid-term debt outstanding at time t,         ltBt
B is the amount of 
long-term debt outstanding at time t, sirBt
B is short-term interest rate paid by firms at time t, mirBt
B 
is mid-term interest rate paid by firms at time t and lirBt
B is long-term interest rate paid by firms 
at time t.  
 
We use the data on monthly interest rate on loan balances and the monthly statements 
on loans and receivables from clients. These all variables are divided according to 
their maturity. Short-term instruments are labeled those with maturity less than 1 year, 
medium-term instruments have maturity between 1 and 5 years and long-term 
instruments are with maturity over 5 years. Data period spans from January 1996 to 
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